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Abstract. Estimates of werkers  ’ willingness to pay for  nonwage  job attributes (e.g., the
rtsk  of injury)  are usually based on hedonic wage methods. In this study, werkers  ’
marginal willingness to pay for nonwage  job attributes is derivedfiom  an analysis ofjob
quitting behavior employing discrete choice models. Empirical estimates of the werkers  ’
marginal willingness to pay for nonwage  job attributes are obtained in two ways. First,
estimates are obtained by re-intelpreting empirical studies of werkers  ’ on-the-job
mobility behavior in the US. Second,  estimates for werkers  ’ willingness to pay for
commuting are derived based on an analysis ofjob  quitting behavior in the Netherlands.
1. Introduction
Economists have long been interested in how the theory of compensating wage
differentials might explain the existente  of wage differences in the labor market. One of
the attractions of this theory is that it allows for the estimation of workers’ marginal
willingness to pay (MWP)  for job attributes (Rosen, 1974, 1986),  usually referred to as .
the hedonic wage approach. Although many studies based on this approach have shown
that non-wage differences between jobs can be significant to workers, the genera1
conclusion is that non-wage differences between jobs are not very  important to workers
(see Brown, 1980; McCue and Reed, 1996).
The theory of compensating wage differentials assurnes that workers have
v
complete information in a static  environment. This assumption is inconsistent with job
search theory, one of the main  theoretical frameworks  to analyse labour market outcomes.
Search theory assurnes that workers have incomplete information in a dynamic
environment, so workers move fi-om  one job to another. Using job search theory, Hwang
et al. (1993) have demonstrated that the estimates for the marginal willingness to pay for a
job attribute using the hedonic wage approach are likely to be biased downwards if it is
not acknowledged that a job is a search good and a result  of a match between an employer
and a worker.’ It would, therefore, be useful  to come up with altemative approaches to
estimating the marginal willingness to pay for a job attribute that explicitly recognizes
that a job is a search good.
Recently, a number of studies have estimated the MWP for job attributes using
data on job moving behavior and compared the MWP estimates with conventional
estimates (Herzog  and Schlottmann, 1990; Gronberg and Reed, 1994; and Van Ommeren
et al. 2000). 2 In line with the reasoning of Hwang et al. (1993),  these studies point to
’ Hwang et al. (1993) reason that hedonic wage approaches are hkely to be biased
downwards, since the costs  of not filling a vacancy are higher  for organisations Lvith
higher  profits. So, these organisations wil1  offer higher  wages and more attracti\.e job
attributes  to job seekers to reduce vacancy durations compared to less profïtahlc
organisations. As a result,  employees working for organisations with higher  pro fit5
receive  higher  wages, along with job attributes  that are more attractive  than would  !Y
predicted by the theory of compensating wage differentials.
2 The notion that job exits are informative on the workers’ willingness to pay for 3  IC+
attribute has some history (see Herzog and Schlottmann, 1990; Van Ornmeren ct .11
2000). Bartel (1982) argues that the effects of the wage and non-wage characteristics .ITC
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considerably higher  estimates than those based on conventional hedonic wage rnethods.
Herzog  and Schlottmann (1990) and Gronberg and Reed (1994) reported higher  estimates
for the willingness to pay to avoid job-induced risk. Van Omrneren et al. (2000) reported
higher  estimates for the MWP to avoid cornmuting. The view that conventional
approaches underestimate the MWP for job attributes is tûrther  supported by the study of
McCue and Reed (1996),  who exarnined self-reported data on the workers’ willingness to
pay for job attributes. They concluded that “workers’ valuations of nonpecuniary
dimensions of work are substantially larger than previous research has indicated”.
The current  study adapts Gronberg and Reed’s (1994) dynamic  approach to
valuation of job attributes. In their paper, a valuation approach is introduced  which has
two distinct characteristics: it is based on a structural job search model, so explicitly
acknowledges that jobs are search goods, and it requires information on job moving
hazard rates.  The job moving hazard rate is the instantaneous rate of leaving a job per unit
time  and can be estimated given job duration data (Kiefer, 1988). Gronberg and Reed
(1994) apply their approach estirnating a range of job hazard models.
The starting point of this paper is to show that the method of estimating MWP
informative on the “relative values” (or “relative importante”)  of the job characteristics
for the worker. Herzog and Schlottmann (1990) estimate the effects of the wage and the
risk in the workplace on the likelihood that the worker switches  to another industry, and
assess the willingness to pay for risk reduction. They also argue that the latter  may differ
fi-om  the hedonic (market) price of risk if the labor market is imperfect, however, they do
not examine a forma1 behavioural model for the switching rate.  Bartik, Butler and Liu
(1992) provide  a similar analysis for the housing market, estimating the willingness to pay
for neighborhood amenities fiom  residential mobility behavior.
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for job attributes as introduced by Gronberg and Reed (1994) is not restricted to the use of
hazard models, but can be extended to the analysis of job mobility using discrete choice
models. This gives the opportunity of estimating the MWP  for job attributes through an
altemative dynamic  approach based on search theory.
In the present paper, MWP estimates are obtained by re-interpreting three
previously published empirical studies (Viscusi,  1980; Robinson, 1990; Gruber and
Madrian, 1994) that have estimated the relationship between job mobility and job
attributes (risk of injury,  risk of cancer,  working conditions, promotion opportunities) by
means  of discrete choice models. The aim of these studies was to obtain information on
the relationship between job mobility behavior and a number of nonwage  job attributes,
but did not discuss the implied monetary value of these attributes. The present paper
contributes  to the literature by showing that these types of studies contain valuable
information on the marginal willingness to pay for nonwage  attributes.
Further, in the current paper, the MWP for commuting is estimated using a
discrete choice model, and is compared to similar estimates based on a hazard model. We
fínd  that the MW? for commuting estimates based on a discrete choice model are close to
those based on a hazard rate model.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2, theory and estimation method
are introduced. In section 3, estimates for the marginal willingness to pay for job
attributes are provided. Section 4 concludes.
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2 . The marginal willingness to pay: theory and estimation method
Z.l.Theory
In the present paper, we consider a slight extension of a standard on-the-job search model,
which excludes nonwage  job attributes. Mathematica1 proofs are omitted  and can be
found in Gronberg and Reed (1994) and Van Ommeren et al. (2000),  respectively.3
The point of departure is an employed individual. This individual derives utility
fiom  wage w and fi-om  a number of job attributes. For simplicity of notation, we suppose
that the individual derives utility íì-om  only one nonwage  job attribute x.
The person searches in the labor market with a certain effort. Search costs are
increasing and convex in search effort. The job anival rate is increasing and concave in
search effort. The effect of the search costs on the instantaneous utility function is
additive (see Van Ommeren et al., 2000). Job attribute offers are drawn randomly fkom  a
given distribution. The involuntary separation rate (due to firing) is given for the workers.
Pooling of offers is not allowed: job offers are either refused  or accepted  before other
offers anive. The individual is assurned to maximize lifetime utility and the environment
is stationary. Given these assumptions, the optimal search effort and the reservation
wages can be determined (see Albrecht  et al., 1991).4  In the present context, the marginal
willingness to pay for an attribute can be defined as the marginal lifetime utility of the
attribute over the marginal lifetime utility of the wage (see Van Ommeren  et al, 2000).
3 The study by Van Ommeren et al. (2000) extends Gronberg and Reed (1994) by
allowing job attributes to vary during job spells.
4 The comparative  statistics  of this model have been derived elsewhere (Mortenson,
The hazard rate of quitting h, the instantaneous rate of leaving the job per unit
time,  is defined as the job arrival rate times  the probability of accepting a job offer.
Suppose that one observes the hazard rate h, the worker’s job attribute x and the worker’s
wage w. Gronberg and Reed (1994) have shown that the worker’s MWP for job attribute
x (MWP,) can be written  as:
(1)
So, the marginal willingness to pay for attribute x equals the ratio of the marginal hazard
rate of job attribute x to the marginal hazard rate of the wage. This is a useful  result.  It
enables one to estimate workers’ willingness to pay for job attributes given duration data
on job quitting behavior. It is also intuitively appeahng, since the effects  of wage and non-
wage characteristics on the job hazard rates are informative on the relative importante  of
the job characteristics for the worker, and therefore on the wilhngness to pay for a non-
wage characteristic.
Job hazard rate models are based on job hazard rates,  whereas discrete choice
models of job moving behavior are based on the probability of moving job during a fïxed
interval. Since the probability of moving job can be written  as a fùnction of the job hazard
rate,  it may be expected that MWP estimates can be obtained using discrete choice
models. Indeed,  it can be shown that equation (1 ) implies (see Appendix 1 for a forma1
demonstration):
(2)
1986).
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where  P is the probability of a worker quitting a job in a certain smal1 interval. Hence, the
marginal willingness to  pay for a job attribute equals the ratio of the marginal probability
of quitting a job of the job attribute to the marginal probability of quitting a job of the
wage. Equation (2) enables one to estimate the marginal willingness to pay for nonwage
job attributes given an analysis of job mobility using discrete choice models.
2.2. Estimation method
In empirical job mobility studies, it is usually assumed that P, the probability of moving
job during a smal1  interval, bas one of the following specifications:
(i) P = f&.x  + pWw); (ii) P = f&.x  + p&r(w)).
where pX and PW  are parameters and In(w)  is the logarithm of the wage. In both cases, fis
a function  determined by the choice of the type of discrete choice model (e.g., logit,
probit). Using equation (2),  specifications (i) and (ii) imply the following formulae for the
marginal willingness to pay for attribute x:
Hence, given consistent estimates of pX  and PW,  the marginal willingness to pay for a
nonwage  job attribute can be calculated.
2.2.1 Estimation of the standard error of the MWP estimates
The standard error of the ratio of two estimated coefficients can be calculated using the
8
delta method (see, for example, Goldberger, 1991). The standard error of the estimated
MWP is then calculated as [Var(/3,)+(p$/3W)2.Var(~W)-2(Bx/Pw>Cov(/3X,/&,)]o~  5/pW  , where
Var denotes the variante  and Cov denotes the covariance. The studies of Viscusi (1980),
Robinson (1990) and Gruber and Madrian (1990) do not report the value of Cov(p,&,),
so we report standard errors fixing the correlation between pX  and PW  to zero. Presuming
other values for the correlation, we fínd  that the standard errors hardly change (we wil1
also report standard errors presuming that the correlation equals 0.2). 5 In appendix 2, we
calculate the relative bias in the standard error, which turns out to be smal1 even for
relatively high values of the correlation between pX and PW. For example, when the
correlation is 0.2, then the relative bias is maximally 10%. Finally, for the application in
section 3.4, we are able to calculate the differente  between estimates based on estimates
of Cov@,,pW)  and estimates based on the assumption that Cov(/5J3,J  equals zero. The
differente  turns  out to be negligible. Hence, the overall conclusion is that, in general,  the
value of Cov(p,,p,)  hardly influences estimates of the standard error of the estimated
MWP, and the assumption that Cov(/&J3,) is equal to zero is acceptable  when calculating
the standard error of the estimated MWP using the delta method.
3. Empirical applications
In this section, we derive MWP estimates based on three studies that have examined
5 Fixing the correlations to zero is not unreasonable, since we know from the hedonic
wage literature that the correlation between job attributes and wages is low (see Brown,
9
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workers’ job quitting behavior in the US: Viscusi (1980),  Robinson (1990) and Gruber
and Madrian (1994). See Table 1. In these studies, job quitting behavior is analyzed by
means  of discrete choice models. Moreover, in these studies, the wage and at least one
nonwage  job attribute are included as explanatory variables of quitting behavior. These
studies report that the wage has a negative effect on job quitting behavior. Further, we
estimate the employees’ marginal willingness to pay for commuting using a probit  model.
These results are compared to the same estimate based on a hazard model (Van Ommeren
et al. 2000).
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Insert table 1
To facilitate comparison of the results, the estimated MWP relative to the mean
wage (multiplied by 100) is also reported, denoted as’ MWIP(R).  One advantage of this
measure is that it is the closest to the empirical specifications employed by Robinson
(1990) and Gruber and Madrian (1994) in which the wage is logarithmically expressed
(see 2.2). In the current study, when interpreting estimates, we use a 5% significante
level, except when otherwise stated.
3.1. Viscusi (1980)
Viscusi (1980) focuses on quit  behavior of individuals in the 1976 University of Michigan
Panel Study of Income  Dynamics  (PSID).  A logit model is employed for males  and
females separately. A job nonwage  attribute variable that measures the industry’s average
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injury  and illness rate (INJRATE) is included. This variable is obtained from an extemal
data source. The annual mean of INJIUTE  is 10.46 (males)  and 7.04 (females),
respectively. The mean wage rate is 4.40 (males)  and 2.85 (females), respectively. The
results can be found in Table 2.
Insert table 2
The results show that the males’ MWP for INJIL4TE is -0.106. This is
equivalent to 2.37% of the males’ mean wage level. This result  implies that industries
where the risk was 10 percent above average  must raise eamings by 2.480h6  to prevent
male workers from quitting to industries where the risk was average. It must be noted that
the estimate is statistically insignificant.
The females’ MWP for INJlL4TE  is statistically significant and equal to -0.129.
The standard error is 0.047.7  This is equivalent to 4.53% of the females’ mean wage level.
This result  implies that industries where the risk was 10 percent above average  must raise
earnings by 3.18% to prevent female workers íì-om  quitting. This estimate is somewhat
higher  than those derived from conventional hedonic wage estimates, which are usually
6 This percentage is obtained by multiplying the males’ average  INJRATE (10.46) and
the estimated MWP relative to the mean wage (2.37),  and taking 10% of the attained
value.
7 The standard error is calculated assuming that the correlation between the estimated
coefficients of the wage and INJIUTE  is zero. When the correlation is assumed to be 0.2,
the standard error is equal to 0.049, thus only marginally higher  than the value of 0.047
used in Table 2.
1 1
less than 2% (see Sider,  1985; Biddle and Zarkin, 1992; Viscusi 1993). Based on the
estimates for INJRATE, the implied value of life estimates is in the range of 4.5 - 7
million dollars, which is also higher  than most conventional estimates which fall in a
range of 2 - 5 million dollars (Viscusi, 1993).8
In conclusion, in line with the theoretical and empirical studies cited in the
introduction, we find  that the MWP estimates for the absente  of risk using the empirical
results of Viscusi (1980) point to higher  estimates than conventional estimates.
3.2. Robinson (1990)
Robinson (1990) analyses the 1978-1980 National Longitudinal  Surveys  (NIS)  of young
men and women  to study the effect of cancer risks on job quitting behavior. Robinson
(1990) uses extemal data sources to create  an index of cancer risk for 23 1 occupations.
Each respondent to the NLS is ascribed his or her occupation’s risk of cancer. Different
logit models are employed using this index of cancer risk and a self-reported measure for
the cancer risk. The eamings are specified  in logarithms.9  Furthermore, three other types
of job attributes are included in the analysis: the absente  of job training, of promotion
prospects and of job security.
’ To calculate  the implied value of life estimates, we have used additional information
on the relationship between INJRATE and the likelihood of death as provided by Viscusi
(1979).
9 To facilitate interpretation, we have standardized the original cancer index (by
dividing the original cancer index by it’s maximum value) so that the index has values
ranging from zero to one inclusive.
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Robinson (1990) shows that the constructed cancer index, a self-reported hazard
exposure and the absente  of promotion opporhmities are positively associated with
quitting. Higher  wage rates are less likely to quit. Job training and job security do not
appear to affect quitting behavior (see Table 3).
Although  the effect of the constructed cancer index and the self-reported hazard
exposure on job mobility are both significant (at a 10% significante  level), only the
estimate for the MWP for the constructed cancer index of risk is significant (at a 10%
significante  level) and equal to 78.2%.
It appears fi-om  Table 3 that the MWP estimates for job training and job security are
small, but the MWP for promotion prospects is about 65% to 70% of the mean wage (see
columns 3 and 5).” We wil1  explain by application of search theory that such an estimate
for the h4WP  estimates for promotion prospects is plausible. To simplify matters, we
consider a simplified search model that allows US to- obtain an explicit  solution for the
MWP for promotion prospects.
hert table 3
Suppose a worker earns wage w and expects to be promoted at rate h. Promoted
workers receive  a wage wp forever (wp > w). The worker discounts the future at rate p.
l” The standard errors are 27.5 and 30.1 respectively, presuming that the correlation
between ‘log wage’ and ‘no promotion prospects’ is zero. Presuming that the correlation
is 0.2, the standard errors are 28.8 and 31.3 respectively, and therefore only marginally
higher  than those used in Table 3.
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Job-to-job mobility is ignored. Lifetime utility V can then be written  as
(pw+hwp)/p(p+h).  The MWP  for h equals (wp-w)/(p+h)  (since dV/aW  = l/(p+h)  and
dV/aA  = (~~-w)/(p+h)~).  So, the MWP for h is positive, and decreasing and concave in h.
In Robinson’s (1990) empirical specification  of job search behavior, a dummy
for ‘no promotion prospects’ is included in the model. The margzhal  willingness to pay
for this  dummy can be interpreted  as the willingness to pay for a certain Zevel of h. The
willinguess  to pay for h is defïned  as [V(h)-V(O)]/N/ih  and can be written  as h/p.(wp-
w). l1
Suppose now that the presence of promotion prospects implies that hip  is 2.00
and promoted workers receive  a wage rise of 35%. The latter  estimate is based on a study
of intemal job mobility which shows that the median percentage differente  in mean pay
across  levels is about 35% (van Gameren,  1999). The promotion rate h might be 0.10
(McCue,  1996) and the yearly discount rate p is 0.05. These assumptions imply that the
h4WP  for promotion prospects is 70% of the mean wage, which is close to the percentage
implied by Robinson’s empirical study. Of course, other numerical assumptions would
have led to different outcomes, but this example indicates  that the value of the empirical
estimate is not implausible and in line with theoretical predictions.
*’  In this example, job-to-job mobility is neglected. Thus the willingness to pay for h is
overestimated. In the case that jobs are offered at rate p and wage offers equal wp,  the
wilhngness  to pay for h can be written  as h.(wp-w)/(p  + p), which is smaller than h.(wP-
WP*
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3.3 Gruber and Madrian (1994)
Gmber  and Madrian (1994) study a policy of limited insurance portability that has been
adopted by a number of states and the federal government in the US over the past 20
years. Insurance  portability has received considerable  attention in the health insurance
literature in the US (Monheit and Cooper, 1994). The data they use come fì-om the panels
of the Survey of Income  and Program Participation. A probit  model of job turnover  is
employed. Wages are logarithmically specified. One job attribute  is the length of
continuation health insurance coverage. Continuation coverage grants individuals the
right to continue purchasing health insurance through their fom2er  employers for a
specified period a$?er  leaving their jobs. The option to purchase health insurance through
the former employers has a number of advantages to workers; it is cheaper, not medically
underwritten and is more generous than individual commercial coverage. The right to
continue purchasing health coverage is, therefore, invaluable when the employee is laid
off or moves to another employer that does not offer health insurance.
Job leavers gain more íï-om  continuation coverage than those who stay.  Let US
focus on the extremes. For job leavers who are unlikely to leave the job, the value of the
option of one additional month of continuation coverage must be close to zero. On the
other hand, for job leavers who anticipate  being laid off within a month, the value of this
option may be worth hundreds of dollars. For the average  worker, the value of this option
must be substantially less.
Gruber and Madrian (1994) estimate the effect of the length of continuation
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coverage on job mobility of men. The estimated coefficients of the logarithm of the
hourly wage and the length of continuation coverage (measured in months) can be found
in Table 4. The MW? for a month of continuation coverage is 3.44% of the mean wage.
The standard error of this estimate is 0.82%.12 To calculate  the MWP we wil1  focus on a
worker who receives  the mean hourly wage of 9 dollars, works 180 hours a month and,
therefore, eams 1620 dollars per month. The absolute MWP for a month of continuation
coverage for this worker is 55 dollars. The MWP for a month of continuation coverage is
between 29 and 8 1 dollars with 95 percent certainty. ’ 3 So, the overall evidente  is that the
economie  value of the option to continue purchasing health insurance through the former
employers is substantial.
Insert table 4
3.4 Marginal willingness to pay for commuting
Recently, Van Ommeren et al. (2000) estimated the employees’ willingness to pay for
commuting distance based on an analysis of job durations using a job hazard  model.14
12 This estimate is based on a zero correlation between the log hourly wage and month
of continuation coverage. Presuming that the correlation is 0.2, the standard error is 0.85,
only marginally higher  than the one used in Table 4.
l3 Gruber and Madrian (1994) provide some specification  checks by estimating four other
specifications. Based on the estimates of these specifications, the MWP for a month of
continuation coverage is estimated between 2.44 and 4.70% of the mean wage.
l4 Van den Berg and Gorter (1997) estimated the marginal willingness to pay for
commuting time  by an analysis of subjective  responses concerning the minimum
16
Here, we wil1  estimate the employees’ MWP for commuting distance based on a probit
analysis of vohmtary  job moves using the sarne data set. This analysis aims to show that
MWP estimates based on discrete choice models and duration models are similar.
The data set used here (called Telepanel), collected in 1992-1993, includes the
complete life cycle pattem of Dutch respondents. This data has been used numerous
times,  so our description here wil1  be brief (for a more extensive description see Van
Ommeren,  2000). The data were collected retrospectively. We use a sample of 372 males
who were observed during  a period of seven years. Here, the main  objective  is to estimate
the MWP for commuting, a topic which has attracted much attention in the field of
transport economics (see Van Ommeren et al. 2000; Small, 1992).
The data set allows US to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary job
moves due to firing. The data include information on the workers’ mumcipalities  of
residence and workplace, which allows US to approximate the commuting distance by the
distance between the centres of the municipalities. The mean commuting distance is 20
kilometres. About 40% of the persons work in the same municipality as they live. For
these persons, we have fixed the commuting distance at one kilometre.15  We include
further  a large number of explanatory variables as suggested by economie  theory (for a
acceptable  wage. This analysis was restricted to unemployed individuals.
l5 To test whether this way of measuring commuting distance affects  our results, we
have re-estimated the probit  model, including a dummy for those who work in the same
municipality as they live. This dummy appears to be statistically insignificant. However,
as anticipated, the coefficients of commuting distance indicate  then a stronger relationship
between commuting distance and mobility then reported in the current paper.
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full discussion and descriptive  data, see Van Ommeren et al. 1999).‘” We investigated
the functional forms of the wage and commuting distance by estimating separate probit
models with linear and log-linear transformations of the wage and distance. With respect
to commuting distance, there is no differente  between the results of the two
specifications. The results below are based on a log-linear specification  of commuting
distance. With respect to the wage, a log-linear transformation fits the data better than a
linear one (for a similar conclusion, see Van Ommeren et al., 1999). Estimation of a
standard probit  model is straightforward. However, in the case of panel data, one should
preferably allow for individual specific  heterogeneity. In the empirical application, we use
both approaches. The results can be found in Table 5 (the full results are found in Van
Ommeren  et al. 1995). It appears that both approaches render almost  identical results.
Insert table 5
The M3VP  for commuting distance are evaluated at an average  distance of 20
kilometres and a wage of 20 Guilders per hour, -0.058 and -0.060 Guilders per kilometre.
*’ The MWP  estimates of Van Ommeren et al. (2000),  based  on a range of job hazard
l6 We include six levels of education, number of subordinates, age, calendar year. SIK
of workplace, industrial sector, job tenure.
l7 The reported standard error of the MWP for commuting distance is 0.0279. 1!*h~::
calculating the standard error of the MW’P,  presuming that the correlation of the estim~l;~,!
coefficients is zero, the standard error is 0.0276. This clearly shows that the standard t‘rror
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models, are -0.051, -0.058 and -0.068, respectively. Thus, the results are essentially the
same.
Presuming a working day of 8 hours, the average  willingness to pay for one
additional kilometre of commuting is -0.46, so employees are willing to pay 2.3% of their
hourly wage to avoid one additional kilometre of commuting. The MWP for commuting
distance implies a MWP for commuting time, which depends on average  commuting
speed. Figures  on average  commuting speed are absent for the Netherlands, but a
reasonable estimate is 20-30 kilometres per hour. ‘*  Presuming an average  commuting
speed of 25 kilometres per hour, the estimated marginal value of commuting time  is 57
percent of the hourly wage rate.  This estimate is in line with Smal1  (1992) who concluded
fì-om  a large number of studies that the average value of time  for the journey-to-work tip
is estimated to be 50 percent of the hourly wage rate.
4. Conclusion
The current  study adapts Gronberg and Reed’s (1994) dynamic approach to valuation of
job attributes, by analysis  of job mobility using discrete choice models. In line with
previous studies that relied  on dynamic approaches, we fïnd  that hIWP estimates are
higher  than conventional static  estimates. For example, based on the study of Viscusi
(1980) conducted in the United States, we find that the implied value of life estimates are
about 4.5-7 million dollars, which is higher  than most conventional estimates which fa11  in
of the hIWP is insensitive to the value of the correlation of the estimated coeffïcients.
‘*  This estimate is based on extemal sources that reveal that one third of the population
commutes  by bicycle or by foot; car  drivers that commute  for less than 16 kilometres have
an average speed of 32 kilometres per hour (Van Ommeren, 2000).
19
a range of 2-5 million dollars.
Gronberg and Reed’s (1994) valuation approach and the approach used here
both assume that workers have identical utility íîmctions,  while assuming that jobs are
search goods in a dynamic environment. lg In contrast, the more conventional hedonic
wage approach does not assume identical utility íünctions,  but assumes a static
environment. A priori, it is impossible to claim that one of the approaches is in genera1
superior (Hexzog and Schlottmann 1990; Gronberg and Reed 1994; Van Ommeren et al.
2000). As emphasized by Gronberg and Reed (1994),  more research is needed to
understand the differences in static  and dynamic approaches to valuation of job attributes
(for comparison of these approaches, see Gronberg and Reed, 1994; Van Ommeren et al.,
2000). We hope that much-needed research on the relationship between static  and
dynamic approaches to the valuation ofjob  attributes wil1  benefit  trom the present paper.
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Appendix 1: Estimating the marginal willingness to pay for job a attribute using
discrete choice models
The close relationship between discrete choice models and continuous time  hazard
models is wel1  known (see Meyer (1990)). Denote T as the employment spell. Then the
hazard rate h(t) is defïned  by the equation:
L i m
Pr(t + E > T 2 t)
= h(t) (3)
HO+ &
The relationship between P, the probability that an employment spel1 ends  before time  t+l
given that is bas  lasted until  time  t, and the hazard rate fünction h(t), is then the following:
t+1
P = 1- Pr(T 2 t + 11 T 2 t ) = 1 - exp[- /h(s)&] = 1 - exp[-h(t)] (4)
given that h(t) is constant between t and t + 1. Hence, (4) implies
(5)
So, given (1) and (5),  equation (2) follows.
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Appendix 2: The relative bias in the standard error of ratio ( p, lp, )
We demonstrate here that the relative bias, defïned  as the ratio of the differente  between
the reported standard error (which is based on the assumption that the correlation between
the estimated coefficients p,  and p,,,  equals zero) and the correctly calculated standard
error to the reported standard error standard is less than ?4 Icorl  , where cor denotes the
correlation between the estimated coeffïcients p,  and p,  .
Proof
The ratio of the correctly calculated s.e.  to the incorrectly calculated s.e. (presuming  cor
= 0) can be written  using the delta method as (where ratio denotes p,  / p, ):
dVZU( var(~Jratio2  - 2.rutio.cor.se(p.).se(p3vz@ .) + var(p Jrutio  2
I
i
var(pJ  + var(~Jrutio2  + 2.Yatio.lcorlse(px).se(P3
var(pJ + vaIfp&-atio2
<
-
d
1 + 2.ratio.lcorl.se(p3.se(B3
var(~J  + var(~w)(ratio)2
25
I Jl+lcorl,
since the maximum of 2.ratio.Jcorl.se(p3.se(p,)  is  obta.ed  when
var(&)  + var(pJratio)2
se(p,)  = se(/?J.ratio.
Finally note that ,/l + Iccx-I < 1 + Y+H-~  .
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Table 1. Studies of job quitting behavior.
Study Sample
Viscusi (1980) 1975-1976, men and
women
Nonwage  job attributes
injury rate
Robinson (  1990) 1978-1980,14-24  years
Gruber and Madrian ( 1994) 1984-1987,
hazard  exposure, job training, promotion
prospects,  job security
continuation  of health benefit  coverage when
Current s tudy
men, 20-54 years
1985-1991, men
leaving job
Commuting dis tance
27
Table 2. Coeffïcients of quit behavior with respect to attributes, males  and females, 1975 (based on
Viscusi, 1980) and the marginal willingness to pay for job attributes.
variables
Males
coefficient  Mwp
Females
coefficient  Mwp MWW-
wage rate -0.226 -0.389
(0.028) (0.037)
INJRATE 0.024 -0.106 -2.37 0.050 -0.129 4.53
(0.020) (0.121) (2.71) (0.018) (0.047) (1.65)
Note: Standard errors  in parentheses. INJRATE is measured as the incidence rate  per million hours
worked. The annual mean of INJRATE is 10.46 (males) and 7.04 (females) respectively. MWF’(R)  is
calculated at the mean wage rate,  which are 4.48 (males) and good strategie  2.85 (females), respectively.
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Table 3: Coeffcients of quit decision with respect to job attributes, young men, 1978-1980, and young
women, 1980-1982, US, (based on Robinson, 1990) and the marginal willingness to pay for job
attributes.
variables
Log wage
Cancer  index
Self-reported hazard  exposure
NO job t ra ining
NO promotion prospects
NO job securi ty
coefficient  MWP(R)
-0.715
(0.193)
0.559 -78.2
(0.304) (43.1)
-0.230 32.2
(0.177) (27.5)
0.465 -65.0
(0.152) (30.2)
-0.055 7.7
(0.171) (27.0)
coefficient h4WP(R)
-0.663
(0.189)
0.292
(0.173)
-0.239
(0.177)
0.463
(0.152)
-0.08 1
(0.171)
-44.0
(30.8)
36.0
(30.1)
-69.8
(32.8)
12.2
(28.7)
Note:  standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 4. Coeffcients of job turnover with respect to job attributes, men, 1983-1989, US, (based on
Gruber and Madrian, 1994) and the marginal willingness to pay for job attributes.
variables coefficient MWW)
log hourly wage -0.134
(0.008)
month  of  cont inuat ion 0.005 55 3.44
coverage
Note:  standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 5. Empirical estimates of discrete choice coeftìcients  for voluntary job-to-job mobility
variables
Cross  Section Panel  Data
coefficient MWW) coeffîcient MWW)
wage rate -0.82 -0.78
(0.12) (0.12)
commuting distauce 0.048 -0.058 -2.31 0.048 - 0.060 -2.43
(0.022) (0.028) (1.14) (0.022) (0.029) (1.20)
Note:  staudard errors  in parentheses.  MWP(R) is  based on a working day of eight  hom.
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